A perfectly good alternative that is reusable and cheaper just demonstrated its effectiveness last week when SpaceX launched a Falcon Heavy mission. Two of the first-stage booster rockets returned to land and will be reused. The main core was never to be reused. The Falcon Heavy’s cost for the mission was but a fraction of what SLS will cost American taxpayers for each Artemis Program launch.
Another Boeing project that has proven to be overpriced and underperforming is the Starliner. Boeing and SpaceX were both awarded contracts to build space taxis to ferry crews from Earth to the International Space Station (ISS). SpaceX built two versions of its Dragon partially reusable module, the first to ferry supplies to the ISS, and Crew Dragon to send people. The Cargo Dragon version has been in operational use since 2012. Crew Dragons have been flying astronauts to the ISS since 2020. NASA pays SpaceX about US $55 million per seat for these flights. And now the Dragon is being used to fly commercial crews to space and the ISS.
Compare this to Boeing’s Starliner. Boeing and SpaceX both were awarded space taxi contracts by NASA at the same time. After that Boeing has demonstrated an ineffectiveness in fulfilling the terms of the contract in a similar fashion to the work it has done on SLS. Fraught with design flaws, Starliner has yet to carry a demonstration crew on board. Its first crewless flight never made it to the ISS because of software glitches. The second crewless attempt finally docked with the ISS in May of this year. Following that mission, we were told that Starliner would fly a crewed mission late in 2022. Then the date slipped to 2023, and this week NASA announced a demo mission for April of next year with the first operational mission of Starliner not happening until 2024 “at the earliest.”
This means Starliner has yet to launch an operational mission in fulfillment of its NASA contract and the reasons why remain only known to the Agency. One would guess that NASA has little confidence in Boeing’s technology. Too many glitches have been logged regarding Starliner’s May mission including ongoing thruster problems, parachutes, and other unresolved technical and software issues. “Inflight anomalies” is the term NASA is using as the primary reason for delaying the commercial operation of Starliner.
And by the way, NASA pays Boeing US $95 million per seat for every astronaut Starliner will carry to the ISS, a $40 million premium over its costs when using the SpaceX Crew Dragon. Yet Boeing says that Starliner is a money-losing proposition with total losses amounting to $883 million to date.
Meanwhile, NASA’s SLS Boeing partnership which was slated to come in at $2 billion per Artemis mission launch is now expected to cost $4.1 billion, and over the last decade since it was first announced has cost the Agency more than $23 billion to date. No doubt, Boeing is claiming it is losing money on this contract as well.
If NASA were to walk away from SLS and start the Artemis Program using Falcon Heavy, and later switch to using the SpaceX Starship once it’s declared spaceflight worthy, the cost to the Agency could be reduced dramatically. The latest Falcon Heavy launch cost more than the $150 million SpaceX price tag established in 2019, but certainly considerably less than Boeing’s SLS. Falcon Heavy provides about 25% less maximum thrust when compared to the SLS, but you could send several Falcon Heavy missions into Earth orbit and assemble components Artemis there for a fraction of the cost of launching one SLS from Earth’s surface. And when Starship goes commercial it will dwarf SLS in terms of maximum thrust and payload capacity and will be reusable and a lot cheaper.
So why is NASA sticking with Boeing? Can someone at the Agency explain this to the American public with a rationale that makes sense?
]]>It was bad enough with the crash of two Boeing 737 Max 8 jets because of poor software engineering and lax testing by the U.S. Federal Aviation Authority that took the company’s word on the reliability of the modified aircraft. Hundreds of lives were lost.
Now we have the Boeing commercial space taxi, the Starliner, designed to launch astronauts to the International Space Station (ISS). Despite the billions NASA has given Boeing, the company can’t seem to build something equivalent to what SpaceX has achieved on a much smaller budget.
It is good to hear Boeing leadership express the need to focus on the safety of the crew as the reason for pulling the plug on Starliner for the moment. It would have been nice if they had been equally intelligent about the 737 redesigns which gave us the Max 8.
The first orbital flight test of Starliner took place in December 2019. It turned into a fiasco because of a software glitch that caused the spacecraft to fall short of achieving the correct orbit to rendezvous and dock with the ISS. Boeing did a rewrite and patch on the software for the second test flight which was supposed to happen two weeks ago. But on August 3rd, the new and improved Starliner ran into a propulsion system valve problem when several valves did not open in response to automated software commands.
Since the scrubbing of the flight these valves that connect to the retro and safety escape system, as well as the thrusters responsible for in-orbit maneuvering, have remained problematic. Nine of the 13 have been successfully opened by using alternative means to make them work. But four, however, have not. Once again Boeing appears to be demonstrating an inability to engineer a finished product to meet specifications.
Wouldn’t you think that this would give NASA pause when it considers the other big Boeing project the agency is counting on the company to deliver, namely the SLS?
In June of this year, the first version of the rocket, SLS Block 1, a 23-storey monster was finally assembled at Florida’s Kennedy Space Center for the first time. Well overdue and over budget by some $8.75 billion USD, the SLS has grown into an $18 billion boondoggle.
The rocket is complex and non-reusable It consists of thousands of parts including propulsion valves like the ones that have given Starliner the fits. Its first stage links massive propellant tanks to four rocket engines. The core is flanked by two solid rocket boosters which are leftover technology from NASA’s shuttle program.
The rocket has yet to make a test flight which is understandable since each time it lights up it costs $2 billion. Instead, NASA and Boeing are relying on ground testing of the core stage. Fortunately, after a misfire, the most recent burn lasting 8 minutes was successful. The duration of the burn was the time needed to get the rocket to reach space. This achievement prompted NASA to accept delivery in Florida. But no one has tested all the mated disparate parts, which raises the issue: will the full assembly perform equally well?
As I previously stated, non-reusability means every flight in the Artemis Program to return crews to the Moon requires a brand new SLS. The goal, currently, is one flight per year if all goes well. But all going well for Boeing isn’t guaranteed. And with each mistake costing $2 billion, doesn’t that seem to you to be a lot of money spent on a company that is of late suspect? Consider the human factor. Are crews prepared to rely on Boeing’s safety and engineering record of the last few years? Or is there an alternative that the Artemis Program can use that’s affordable and readily available now with little modification?
The SpaceX Falcon Heavy which is flight proven but seldom used is an almost totally reusable system. It is already contracted to launch payloads to the Moon beginning next year. Two years ago, then NASA administrator, Jim Bridenstine, when asked if Falcon Heavy could substitute for the SLS, stated it would require adding an additional stage built by United Launch Alliance which would then be mated to the SpaceX rocket to provide additional payload and thrust. The integration would occur here on Earth and would include a larger payload fairing than the current one used by the Falcon Heavy.
But an even better strategy, that I wrote about in 2019, would borrow from what has been learned in assembling the ISS in low-Earth orbit. It would involve:
SpaceX has already demonstrated with its Falcon 9 and Falcon Heavy that it can deliver payloads to space at a fraction of the launch and assembly cost of one SLS. Over the next year, the Falcon Heavy will show it can deliver payloads all the way to the Moon fulfilling both NASA and third-party contracts. And note that none of these missions require the Starship, SpaceX’s fully reusable multistage rocket which is quickly being developed in plain sight in South Texas. Elon Musk has even announced a 2023 circumlunar voyage with passengers and believes he can land human crews on the lunar surface before 2024 ahead of the Artemis Program’s original target date. And with multiple Starships, even the Orion crew module can be considered a redundant and unnecessary expense.
To me, the Boeing SLS project is nothing more than a make-work pork-barrel project, the type favoured by American politicians whose districts receive money for the military and NASA. When you add in Boeing’s record of snafus and engineering miscalculations, let alone the hundreds who died because of the company’s failures, you have to wonder what are the folks in Congress and at NASA thinking?
]]>Then there was the Space Launch System (SLS) boondoggle with cost overruns in the billions for development of a single-use rocket for NASA’s Artemis Program. Years behind schedule, and still with no fully-assembled rocket, Boeing has demonstrated its inability to meet both physical and financial deadlines.
And now the latest, the launch of Boeing’s commercial crew module, Starliner, has run into its own problems. the uncrewed test of the Starliner launched yesterday failed to reach an orbit that will allow it to rendezvous with the International Space Station (ISS). Launched on the ULA Atlas-5 rocket (ULA is a consortium involving Boeing and Lockheed Martin) the future space taxi fired its engines at the wrong time because of an onboard clock malfunction. This meant too much fuel was used ending the opportunity to rendezvous and dock with the ISS.
For the folks at SpaceX, the other commercial space partner that NASA intends to use to ferry crews to the ISS and back, the failure of the Starliner to meet its objectives, tasted a bit sour. SpaceX is the junior partner in terms of funding in NASA’s Commercial Space Program. Boeing has received $4.82 billion to SpaceX’s $3.14 billion. Both companies have been commissioned to fly six trips to the ISS. A seat on Boeing’s Starliner will cost NASA $90 million while SpaceX will deliver each astronaut for $55 million. That compares to $86 million to buy a seat on the current Soyuz provider. Based on the numbers, it doesn’t make a lot of sense to use Boeing as a primary contractor for ISS crew delivery. But nonetheless, NASA continues to justify its commitment to Boeing as a prime commercial space partner.
The question I ask is why? It seems that Boeing cannot get many things right these days. The Starliner, like SLS, and the Max-8, has been beset with problems. First, it was reported engine problems in early testing contributing to a two-year delay in the project, then it was a parachute failing to open in an abort test, and now, in the first launch to orbit, an onboard failure that will mean Boeing on this mission will not be able to test rendezvous and docking, two essential requirements for fulfilling its crew delivery contract.
There is no doubt now that SpaceX will be the first non-government provider to give Americans a ride to the ISS and that it will happen, most likely, in the first half of 2020. SpaceX’s last test is scheduled for January 10, 2020, when they will deliberately abort a launch. As for Boeing, who knows when the company will unscramble the mess that seems to be part and parcel of its engineering efforts of late.
When asked about the latest Boeing snafu, NASA administrator, Jim Bridenstine (neither scientist, nor engineer), stated that if astronauts had been on board the Starliner would “be orbiting, or docking with the space station” now. But wasn’t this orbital test all about ensuring an extra margin of safety using automated systems in the event astronauts were somehow unavailable to take over? It seems in the age of Boeing and NASA’s current human space program, that less than perfect is becoming an accepted standard.
One only hopes that the Starliner manages a safe ground landing this Sunday, a first for American spacecraft intended for human crews. Until now all landings have been on water. The shortened mission, now only 48 hours, may provide enough useful information about the capsule’s performance in space to lessen any delay caused by the snafu.
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